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SOVIET POLICY ON INTERNATIONAL
REGULATION OF
HIGH SEAS FISHERIES
MORITAKA HAYASHI*
Over the past several years, the fishing activities of the Soviet Union
have grown so rapidly that today she is the third largest fishing state in
the world, trailing only Peru and Japan in total catch.' To make such
vigorous growth possible, the Soviet fishing fleet has been developed
into the world's largest and most modern, and its fishing activities have
been expanded into almost every corner of the world's oceans. In fact,
the Soviet Union has increased her fishing operations so extensively that
today it is estimated that over 90% of her total catch is being made by
long-distance ocean going vessels.2
The markedly increased fishing of the high seas by the Soviet Union
(and other countries as well) has caused various problems related to
international law. Some of these problems are today so serious that un-
less proper means of accommodation are found, they may possibly lead
to the creation of dangerous amounts of friction between competing
nations, or the monopoly of the fishing resources by a small number of
states, or worse yet, the total depletion of certain stocks of fish. In an
attempt to avoid such a chaotic situation, fishing countries have already
*LL.M. (Waseda and Tulane); M.A. (Pennsylvania). Lecturer, Hosei University;
Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
1. The Soviet Union's total catch in 1969 was about 6.5 million metric tons as
compared with Peru's 9.1 million and Japan's 8.6 million. FAO, 28 Y.B. OF FISHERY
STATISTICS at a-18 (1970).
2. GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
SovIET SEA POWER 94 (1969). The Soviet Union is the world's leading owner of larger
fishing vessels. Their expansion plans continue "full speed," with the recent announce-
ment by the Fishery Ministry of a thirty per cent increase in factory stern trawlers to
be built in the country for 1970-75. 33 CoMMiNIERCIAL FISHERIES REviEW, April 1971, at 58.
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concluded several dozens of agreements (bilateral as well as multilat-
eral) concerning fishing on the high seas. The purpose of this article is
to review Soviet participation in such international agreements and to
determine the salient features of her approach to international coopera-
tion in regard to high seas fishing.
I
THE SOVEREIGNTY HYPOTHESIS
In pursuing the analysis, the primary focus will be placed on the often-
mentioned Soviet attitude towards sovereignty in international law. It
is frequently pointed out in Western literature that the Soviet concept
of sovereignty is "absolute" or that Soviet international law theory puts
great emphasis on the concept of state sovereignty. 3 Whether this is true
or not in practice in every field of international law has not been proven.
Such an assertion has generally been taken literally from the writings
of the Soviet publicists. It is a mere hypothesis - what shall be called the
"sovereignty hypothesis" - that has yet to be tested by actual Soviet
behavior. This is particularly important since in Soviet international
law, doctrine and practice are, it is justly warned,4 not always the same.
How, then, can one go about "testing" the sovereignty hypothesis in
relation to the field of fisheries regulations on the high seas?
It is submitted that the best manner in which to test it is through the
3. For example, Prof. Quigley points out that "(u) nderlying much of Soviet
theory of international law is the Soviet emphasis on the concept of state sovereignty."
Quigley, The New Soviet Approach to International Law, 7 HARV. INT'L L. J. 1, 22(1965). See also K. GRZYBOWSKI, SovIET PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 32-33 J1970).
Although a Soviet textbook says that the concept of absolute sovereignty is incom-
patible with contemporary international peaceful coexistence, SOVIErSKOE GOSUDAasrVO
I MfEZHDUNARODNOE PRAVO 166-67 (Kozhevnikov ed. 1967), Ramundo points out that
a departure from earlier positions is "more apparent than real," and the Soviets
still maintain "the primacy of state sovereignty as the fundamental, underlying
principle of coexistence." B. RAMiUNDO, PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE 92 (1967).
4. "On many occasions Soviet legal theory is strongly influenced, indeed is often
directly inspired, by positions taken by Soviet diplomats in international conferences
or organizations, or in bilateral diplomacy. However, on other occasions Sovietjurists write what in effect is a brief for changing the law to accord with Soviet inter-
ests; and in the latter case their theoretical positions may or may not accord with
State practice or represent official views. And increasingly Soviet international lawyers
express views which clearly are personal and are not necessarily shared by their
own colleagues." Butler, Some Recent Developments in Soviet Maritime Law, 4 INT'L
LAWYER 702 n. 17 (1970).
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enforcement of these regulations. By enforcement, we mean the process
of putting rules of law into execution through actual use or threat of
legitimate physical force. 5 Examples of this are arrest, a criminal or civil
trial, and the entry of a judgment by a court.6
Enforcement of any rule at the international level requires a state to
take or refrain from taking certain action regardless of its desirability
at that particular moment. It requires acceptance of the exercising of
a jurisdiction other than its own state authority over a particular sub-
ject matter which has heretofore been exclusively within the jurisdic-
tional sovereignty of the state. This is clearly at variance with the con-
cept of sovereignty that is recognized to include "a situation in which
a state has the right to control internal relations affecting the population
within its territory and is not restricted, in this sense, by the similar
right of any other state affecting the condition of its territory or popu-
lation."7 Thus, the more a state accepts the jurisdiction of an outside
power, whether it is another state or an international authority, the
more that state acknowledges limitations on its sovereignty. It can also
be assumed that acceptance of an international authority's jurisdiction
involves a greater degree of limitation of sovereignty than does
acceptance of that of another state on the basis of reciprocity.
In order to assess systematically the degree of sovereignty limitation
recognized by the Soviet Union in the context of fisheries regulations
one may usefully employ a scale developed by Robert L. Friedheim for
his analysis of the United Nations debate on ocean resources.8 This
scale, the "nationalism-internationalism scale," identifies four models of
national attitudes toward the ocean resources:
(1) Normative nationalist,
(2) Functional nationalist,
(3) Functional internationalist,
(4) Normative internationalist. 9
5. Some define "enforcement" as "the process by which an arrangement is made
effective, or.. . the process designed to compel obedience to the rules." A. KOERS,
THE ENFORCEMENT OF FISHERIES AGREEMENTS ON THE HIGH SEAS: A COiPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL STATE PRACTICE 2 (Univ. of Rhode Island Law of the
Sea Institute Occasional Paper No. 6, 1970). This seems to be too broad a definition
for this analysis. A strict legal definition that differentiates from a mere inspection
of compliance or a recommendation of rule application is more desirable.
6. See RESrATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 6,
comment a at 20 (1965).
7. K. GRZYBOWSKI, supra note 3, at 32.
8. R. FRIEDHEIM, UNDERSTANDING THE DEBATE ON OCEAN REsouRcEs (Univ. of Den-
ver Monograph Series in World Affairs, vol. 6, no. 3, 1969).
9. The characteristics of these models can be summarized as follows: Normative
1972]
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The model attitudes, modified to reflect varied approaches to the nar-
rower issue of the enforcement of high seas fisheries regulations, evidence
the following properties:
(1) Normative nationalists adopt a strict notion of state sovereignty.
They exercise state jurisdiction to the fullest extent possible, both in its
territorial and personal aspects. This means that on the high seas the
flag state has exclusive jurisdiction over a fishing vessel and persons on
board. Although this is a principle embodied in the 1958 Convention
on the High Seas, the Convention keeps a path open for exceptions by
special agreements. 10 Normative nationalists are reluctant to enter into
such special agreements, adhering to the strict flag-state principle.
(2) Functional nationalists take the view that although nation-states
Nationalists urge that nation-states deserve the resources to survive and prosper. They
rely on the core concepts of the nation-state--"territoriality" and "soverignty"-and
hope to extend these to water-covered areas beyond their geographically fixed dry
land territories.
Functional Nationalists rely on one fundamental assumption: that the na-
tion-state is still viable, perhaps the most useful institution to entrust decisions
requiring political and economic power. They argue that despite the apparent de-
cline in the capacity of the nation-state to solve all major problems which it faces,
it can solve some of them. Although those who advocate such solutions are nationalist
in form they are functional in substance. Their concern is to solve problems in the
short run, and for this they need the nation-state with its claim to a defined territory,
known practice and established administrative structure. While normative notions
of nationalism are not absent in the ideas and proposals presented by functional
nationalists, there is less emphasis upon them and less sentiment for the nation-state as
the repository of "nationhood."
Functional Internationalists are conscious of those who use the oceans and ate
willing to perform service for users. Basic to all functional internationalist pro-
posals is the notion of the growing interdependence of states in the modern world
and the belief that many problems transcend national borders and cannot be solved
by traditional state mechanisms. There is a recognition that certain functions can
be most effectively performed at the international level. Inherent in the functional
internationalist schemes are: (1) concentration on a specific problem rather than the
system as a whole; and (2) preference for an international agency to perform specific
tasks.
Normative Internationalists have the hope of internationalizing all or part of the
world's oceans or their resources as a key element in a grand design to assure world
peace and prosperity. Normative Internationalist proposals often share one or more
of six characteristics: (I) concern for the central problems of world politics; (2)
awareness that the end they seek is the development of a sense of world community;
(3) concentration upon problems of conflict; (4) concern for formal organization,
particularly, insistence upon development of international enforcement mechanisms;
(5) ethical obligation to redistribute the world's wealth; and (6) the attempt to
provide the United Nations with a source of independent income. Id. at 2-50.
10. Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature April 29, 1958, art. VI,
[1962] 2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter cited as Geneva
Convention].
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are no longer the best machinery for solving problems of high seas fish-
eries, they can still play a major part in their solution. They might agree
to entrusting an international authority with power to decide certain
policy issues, but they restrict enforcement power solely to national au-
thorities. Functional nationalists argue for such national jurisdiction
not because they favor it ideologically but because nation-states are be-
lieved to be the most efficient institutions to deal with the problems. In
other words, it is considered to be functionally more effective for nation-
states to retain the power of enforcement than to give it to an interna-
tional body.
(3) Functional internationalists hold that the international system
has undergone a revolutionary change, and that nation-states are no
longer the best institutions to serve the needs of men. In the modern
world where more and more problems tend to be transnational, they
argue that transnational solutions are in order. They do not urge that
every problem of high seas fisheries can best be settled by international
authorities, but only that international authorities can at least help
supervise the enforcement of high seas fisheries regulations. They do not,
however, go so far as to deprive the nation-states of enforcement power;
instead, they allow international bodies to exert some degree of control
over the process of enforcement by individual nation-states.
(4) Normative internationalists fully extend the functional interna-
tionalist's view and argue that international bodies should have exten-
sive jurisdiction over the matter of enforcing fishing regulations on the
high seas. Under this view, an international agency is directly responsible
for arresting and punishing fishermen of any state. Nation-states can
also retain enforcement power, but it is subject to the final review of a
superior international authority.
II
POLICY STATEMENTS ON THE CONSERVATION OF LIVING RESOURCES
Generally speaking, treaties concerning the regulation of high seas
fisheries deal with two different types of activities. One is the conserva-
tion (and rational exploitation) of living resources, the other is the
conduct of fishing operations." Treaties relating specifically to fishing
11. "Fishing operations" include the identification and marking of fishing vessels
1972]
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operations are few in number, and the only multilateral convention in
which the Soviet Union participates, the Convention on Conduct of
Fishing Operations in the North Atlantic signed in London in 1967, is
not yet in force. Since no other significant treaty has been concluded
in this area by the Soviet Union, the following analysis will focus on
treaties concerned with the first type of activities, the conservation of
resources.
It was once widely believed that the living resources of the sea were
inexhaustible. Now this view is generally held invalid, and measures
calling for the conservation of the resources while still allowing rational
exploitation have been proposed by many scientists as well as economists
and lawyers. Soviet writers on the law of the sea generally agree. Thus, ac-
cording to a standard Soviet maritime law text:
"It can be stated that an international legal principle is now being developed,
according to which all States not only have the right to engage in fishing
on the high seas but must also take measures to protect fishery preserves
(i.e., to fish rationally) ."12
It is possible for a coastal state to take two approaches to such con-
servation measures on the high seas. One is unilateral and the other
bilateral or multilateral, i.e., international. While the former usually
insists on "special rights" of coastal states based mainly on geographical
proximity, the latter denies such special rights and emphasizes necessity
of agreement among interested countries. Although some Soviet policy
statements are found in the 1955 Rome Conference on the conservation
of living resources of the sea,13 it was at the 1958 Geneva Conference
on the Law of the Sea that the Soviet delegates began to take less am-
biguous views on this issue. The Soviet preferences which were made
clear in the debates of the Geneva Conference can be summarized in
the following three points:
First, the Soviet Union is "wholeheartedly in favor" of the principle
of the conservation of the living resources of the high seas, and generally
considers that the solution of the problems of fisheries regulations based
on conservation measures should be sought through international co-
operation. 14
and gear, signals to be used by fishing vessels and certain rules which must be ob-
served by such vessels on fishing grounds. J. E. CARROZ AND A. G. ROCHE, The Inter-
national Policing of High Sea Fisheries, 6 CANADIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 61, 65 (1968).
12. P. D. BARABOLYA, ET AL., MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL MARITIME LAW 227 (1966.
13. See F. DE HARTINGH, LEs CONCEPTIONS SOVIkrIQUES DU DROIT DE LA MER 95
(1960.
14. 5 Official Records of the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (third com-
[Vol. 5:131
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Second, she is against extreme unilateralism in extending coastal
states' exclusive jurisdiction over high sea fisheries for conservation pur-
poses. In particular, she denounces the so-called "abstention principle"
as at variance with the principle of equality of rights and freedom of
the high seas. 15
Third, she would nevertheless allow a coastal state the right to take
unilateral measures to regulate fishing subject to certain conditions. For
example, if a coastal state is fishing a certain stock in an area where it
alone has or intends to make efforts to increase the size of the stock,
then, the Soviets believe that state has the right to adopt unilateral
measures. 16
More specifically, her approach can be illustrated by the following
proposal by the Soviet delegation to the Third Committee:
1. Any coastal State having a special interest in the maintenance of the
productivity of the living resources of any area of the high seas adjacent to
its territorial sea may, to this end, adopt unilateral measures of conservation
appropriate to any stock of fish or other marine resources in any area of
the high seas adjacent to its territorial sea, provided that negotiations to that
effect with other States concerned have not led to an agreement within a
reasonable period of time.
2. The measures which the coastal State adopts under the previous para-
graph shall be valid as to other States only if the following requirements
are fulfilled:
(a) That scientific evidence shows that there is an urgent need for
measures of conservation;(b) That the measures adopted are based on appropriate scientific find-
ings;
(c) That they do not discriminate against foreign fishermen;
(d) That they are essential, in order to ensure that the general steps taken
by that State to safeguard the reproduction of the living marine re-
sources are effective.17
With the exception of paragraph 2 (d) and other minor modifications,
the essence of this proposal was adopted by the.Conference. It appears
in Article 7 (1), (2) of the Convention on Fishing and Conservation
of the Living Resources of the High Seas.' 8 Although the Soviet Union
has not ratified the Convention, it is not because of the provisions re-
lating to conservation policy, but rather because of those concerning
mittee) 7, UN Doc. A/CONF. 13/41 (1958).
15. Id. at 8, 104.
16. Id. at 58.
17. 5 Official Records of the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (third com-
mittee) Annex at 147, UN Doc. A/CONF. 13/C.3/L.42 (1958).
18. Opened for signature April 29, 1958, [1966] 1 U.S.T. 138, T.IA.S. No. 5969,
559 U.N.T.S. 286.
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the compulsory procedure for settlement of disputes and the prohibition
of reservations.' 9
It is clear from the above that the Soviet Union, as far as policy state-
ments are concerned, is essentially in favor of taking an international
approach to the conservation of high seas fishery resources. Only in ex-
ceptional cases and under strictly limited conditions would she allow
unilateral measures of coastal states to be taken.
How, then, are these policy preferences reflected in the treaty practice
of the Soviet Government? How "international" are the measures en-
visaged in the treaties? How effective are they purported to be in terms
of their enforcement? These are the questions addressed in the next
sections.
III
TREATY PRACTICE ON HIGH SEAs FISHERIES
Before proceeding to analyze Soviet attitudes toward enforcement of
fisheries regulations, an attempt should be made to examine principal
features of the major high seas fisheries agreements to which the Soviet
Union is a party. This will offer a general idea on the kinds of arrange-
ments she has accepted to date.
A. Multilateral Conventions
1. Interim Convention on the Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals
During the latter half of the nineteenth century, there was a great ex-
pansion in the seal harvest in the North Pacific. This led to clear signs of
depletion of the fur seal stock, necessitating some form of protective
measures.
In an effort to curb this abuse, the Convention for the Protection of
Fur Seals in the North Pacific Ocean, was concluded in 1911 by the United
States, Russia, Japan and Canada.20 The parties to the Convention
agreed to ban pelagic sealing and set up a system of enforcement of the
regulations by the men of war of the signatories. The Soviet Union con-
firmed her adherence to this treaty in 1926, issuing a regulation restrict-
19. WILLIAM E. BUTLER, THE SoviEr UNION AND THE LAw OF THE SEA 193 (1971);
See also BARABOLYA, ET AL., supra note 12, at 227.
20. For the background of this Convention see D.M. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF FISHERIES 264 ff. (1965).
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ing fur seal hunting.21 This Convention proved to be the first Soviet
commitment to the regulation of rational exploitation of maritime re-
sources.
22
The 1911 Convention was terminated by Japan in 1941 in accord-
ance with its provisions. Although there followed a period without inter-
national regulation in the North Pacific sealing, except for a U.S.-Can-
adian provisional accord, the substance of the 1911 Convention was re-
vived in 1957 when the Interim Convention on the Conservation of North
Pacific Fur Seals23 went into force among the same four parties.
The new Convention sets up the North Pacific Fur Seal Commission
composed of one member from each party. The Commission has the
duty to formulate and coordinate research programs for the rational
exploitation and conservation of the fur seal resources and to recommend
such programs to the parties for implementation. It has also the power
to recommend appropriate measures necessary for the conservation of the
fur seal resources. 24 In order to implement the ban on pelagic sealing,
a system of mutual inspection and seizure of vessels based on the 1911
scheme was stipulated.25
2. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling
Although attempts to regulate whaling at the international level date
back to the late 1930's, all the pre-Vorld War II regulations were limited
in scope and membership. A genuine effort to establish international
regulation came in 1946 when all the whaling nations met in a Wrash-
ington conference. As a result, the International Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling 26 was adopted. It came into force on November
10, 1948. The Convention set up the International Whaling Commis-
sion (IWC) which has power to recommend and conduct research relat-
ing to whales and whaling, and to collect, study and disseminate infor-
mation relating to the conservation of the resources.27
21. K. GRZYBOWSKI, supra note 3, at 170.
22. Id.
23. Feb. 9, 1957, [1957] 2 U.S.T. 2283, T.IA.S. No. 3948, 314 U.N.T.S. 105
[hereinafter cited as Interim Convention on Seals]. The Convention was extended
or six years in 1963 and for 18 years in 1969.
24. Id. art. V.
25. Id. art. VI.
26. Opened for signature Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716 (1948), T.I.A.S. No. 1849, 161
U.N.T.S. 72 [hereinafter cited as IWC Convention]. The signatory states were: Au-
stralia, Argentina, Brazil, United Kingdom, Denmark, Canada, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Peru, USSR, USA, France, Chile, and South Africa. Later Iceland,
Mexico, Panama, Sweden, and Japan adhered to the Convention.
27. Id. art. IV.
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The Commission also has the power to adopt, by a three-fourths ma-
jority, regulations with respect to the conservation and utilization of
whale resources. Such regulations are to be adopted in the form of
amendments to the Schedule attached to the Convention, and are to be-
come effective, as a rule, ninety days after notification of the parties.2 8
The Schedule as it stands now forbids taking and killing certain species,
with or without time limitations, designates sanctuaries in the Atlantic,
Pacific and Indian Oceans, and sets forth the maximum catch of whales
permissible during the open seasons in the Antarctic. It also requires
each factory ship to have at least two inspectors appointed by the Gov-
ernment of the flag state and, in case of land stations, "adequate inspec-
tion" must be maintained. A stronger system of inspections, to be con-
ducted by truly international teams, is currently being prepared.29
3. International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
The Northwest Atlantic is one of the oldest and most developed inter-
national fishing grounds. Confronted with signs of the depletion of some
species in the area, interested countries met in Washington, D.C. to con-
clude a convention for the investigation, protection and conservation of
fishery resources in the area. On February 8, 1949, they adopted the
International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries. 0 This
Convention came into force on July 3, 1950, and the Soviet Union, having
begun to fish in the area covered by the Convention in the late fifties, ad-
hered to it on April 10, 1958.
The Convention established the International Commission for the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) composed of representatives from
all the parties. Decisions of the Commission are determined by a two-
thirds vote of the parties. Among the Commission's functions are: to
make scientific investigations and to collect and analyze information on
the state of fishery resources; to study and appraise information on pos-
sible conservation measures; and to disseminate reports and various data
concerning fisheries in the Northwest Atlantic area.31
The Convention has also established five Panels, one for each of the
five "sub-areas" of the Northwest Atlantic. Each Panel is responsible for
28. Id. arts. III, V.
29. See pp. 156-58 infra.
30. Opened for signature Feb. 8, 1949, [1950] 1 U.S.T. 477, T.I.A.S. No. 2089, 157
U.N.T.S. 157 [hereinafter cited as ICNAF Convention]. The Parties are: United King-
dom, Denmark, Iceland, Spain, Italy, Canada, Norway, Poland, Rumania, Portugal,
USA, Federal Republic of Germany, France, USSR, and Japan.
31. Id. art. VI.
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reviewing the fisheries of its sub-area and information, including scien-
tific data, relevant to them. The Panel may recommend studies and in-
vestigations to the Commission, and must investigate and report on any
matter referred to it by the Commission. The Panels may also make
recommendations to the Commission for joint action by the parties for
the protection and conservation of the resources. Based on such recom-
mendations, the Commission may draw up proposals for keeping certain
stocks of fish at a level permitting the maximum sustainable catch by
the application of appropriate conservation measures. These measures
include establishing open and closed seasons, closing portions of sub-
areas, fixing size limits for any species, prohibiting certain gear and
setting an over-all catch limit for any species. 3 2
In practice, this procedure of developing regulatory measures has
caused problems because any party on the Panel in question may ob-
ject or make reservations to a Commission proposal. Such reservations
themselves must be accepted by all parties concerned in order to
become effective. Thus at present, ICNAF has a "serious accumulation
of proposals, and amendments and reservations to proposals which had
not been fully accepted." 33 Once the proposals become effective, however,
the parties are obligated to take necessary measures to implement them
and to report to the Commission on such measures. 34 In addition to this,
ICNAF has recently adopted a scheme for international inspection of
enforcement of its regulatory measures. 35
4. West Pacific Research Agreement
In 1956, the USSR, China, North Vietnam, and North Korea signed
an Agreement Concerning Cooperation in Conducting Fishery, Oceano-
logical, and Limnological Research in the Western Pacific Ocean.36
Later, Mongolia acceded to it and China withdrew from it. The pur-
pose of the Agreement was to establish a system of cooperation in fish-
32. Id. arts. VII, VIII.
33. C. E. LucAs, INTERNATIONAL FISHERY BoDiEs OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC 19 (Univ.
of Rhode Island Law of the Sea Institute Occasional Paper No. 5, 1970).
34. ICNAF Convention, art. XII.
35. See vp. 154-55 infra.
36. June 12, 1956, 18 Sbnorik Deist. Dogovorov 347, 6 Soy. STAT. AND DEC. 367 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as West Pacific Research Agreement].
37. According to an unconfirmed source, the Soviet Union concluded an agreement
with North Korea in 1967, after Peking's withdrawal from the Northwest Pacific
Fisheries Commission, for cooperation on fisheries. A Joint Fisheries Commission was
also established afterwards. 132 COMMERCIAL FIsHmEs REvIEW, July 1970, at 56.
1972]
Cornell International Law Journal
ery as well as oceanological and limnological research aimed at work-
ing out scientific principles for the conservation of marine life and
securing the maximum sustainable catch. The area covered by the Agree-
ment is the western part of the Pacific including the Japan Sea, Yellow
Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea, as well as "adjacent border
waters" of the parties. 38
The Agreement established a Commission for Fishery Research of
the Western Pacific Ocean (the West Pacific Fishery Commission). The
principal functions of the Commission are to work out joint research
and organize mutual exchange of independent research findings; to work
out measures needed to maintain and increase the fishery resources; and
to draw up plans for scientific and technical cooperation and mutual
aid in fisheries.3 9 The Commission can, if it deems necessary, make rec-
ommendations on these matters by a simple majority vote. Such recom-
mendations are transmitted to the parties and become effective if the
party or parties concerned give notice of their approval to the permanent
Secretariat. 40
Although the provisions of the Agreement are broad enough for the
Commission to recommend "measures needed to maintain and increase
the fishery resources," 41 no concrete measure nor system of enforcement
is stipulated.
5. Black Sea Fishery Agreement
The Soviet Union has concluded a similar agreement for joint efforts
in scientific research and development of fishing in the Black Sea. The
Agreement was signed on July 7, 1959 by the USSR, Rumania and Bul-
garia.42 In addition to the provisions for cooperation in scientific re-
search and development of fishing efforts, the Agreement prescribes
minimum permissible sizes for the catch of eight named species of fish,
and requires that those of smaller size be thrown back into the sea.
Taking of certain species is totally prohibited. 43
The Agreement has also established a Mixed Commission which has,
among others, the following functions: 41
38. West Pacific Research Agreement, art. 1.
39. Id. art. 3.
40. Id. art. 2.
41. Id. art. 3 (3).
42. Convention Concerning Fishing in the Black Sea, July 7, 1959, 377 U.N.T.S. 203
[hereinafter cited as Black Sea Fishery Agreement].
43. Id. art. 5.
44. Id. art. 9.
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(1) to work out agreed measures relating to the regulation of fishing
and the techniques of commercial fishing;
(2) to make changes in the minimum size and species of fish which
are made subject to regulation; and
(3) to coordinate national research projects concerning fishing in the
Black Sea.
The Mixed Commission can adopt "decisions" concerning point (2)
above, and it can make recommendations on all other matters. Although
unanimity is required for the adoption of such decisions and recommen-
dations by the Mixed Commission, recommendations become binding
automatically unless one of the parties gives notice of objections to them
within four months of adoption.4 5
6. Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Convention
Since the middle of the nineteenth century, several multilateral at-
tempts have been made to regulate fishing activities in the Northeast
Atlantic, especially in the North Sea, in order to prevent depletion of
the resources. After World War II, a London Conference of 1946 - In-
ternational Overfishing Conference - adopted the North Sea Conven-
tion of 1946,46 to which the Soviet Union acceded in 1958. The Con-
vention prescribed the minimum size of meshes to be used, and the
minimum measurement for twelve species of fish which can be taken.
It also established a Permanent Commission of the International Fish-
eries.
In spite of some merits, the 1946 Convention suffered from several
weaknesses, and failed to prevent overfishing effectively.4 7 Therefore, in
1959 the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Convention 48 was concluded cov-
ering the whole Northeast Atlantic from the Barents Sea to the Strait
of Gibraltar. The new Convention stipulated, in addition to the rules
45. Id. arts. 9, 10.
46. The Convention for the Regulation of the Meshes of Fishing Nets and the Size
Limits of Fish, April 5, 1946, 231 U.N.T.S. 199. The Convention came into force in
1954.
47. Lucas, Regulation of North Sea Fisheries under the Convention of 1946, PAPERS
PRESENTED AT THE INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL CONFERENCE ON THE CONSERVATION OF THE
LIVING RESOURCFS OF THE SEA 172 ff. (1955). U.N. Doc. A/CONF.10/7.
48. Opened for signature Jan. 24, 1959, 486 U.N.T.S. 157 (effective June 1963)
[hereinafter cited as NEAFO Convention]. The member states are: Belgium, Denmark,
France, Federal Republic of Germany, Poland, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and
USSR.
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concerning mesh and size limit, new measures relating to fishing gear
and appliances, closed seasons and areas, and fishing efforts. It also pro-
vided for measures to increase marine resources. In place of the Per-
manent Commission, a new Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission
was formed with powers to make recommendations for national as well
as international measures of control on the high seas fisheries by means
of a vote of two-thirds of its members.49 Under this new mandate, the
NEAFG has been quite active in establishing schemes of enforcement
at national and international levels.50
B. Bilateral Agreements
1. Northwest Pacific Fisheries Convention (with Japan)
Although the Japanese fishing operations in the North Pacific were
suspended for several years after World War II, the Japanese resumed
commercial fishing in 1952 when the San Francisco Peace Treaty went
into effect. Soon afterwards, they began to intensify their activities, es-
pecially in the northwestern part of the Pacific. By 1955, the yearly in-
crease in the Japanese salmon catch off the coast of the USSR caused
great alarm to the Soviets, just about the same time as the Japanese-
Soviet talks on the resumption of normal relations came to a deadlock
on the territorial issue of the Northern Islands.
Thereupon, the Soviet Union announced the so-called "Bulganin
Line" on the high seas in the western part of the Bering Sea, closing in
effect part of the Bering Sea and the entire Sea of Okhotsk to Japanese
fishermen.51 Following strong protests by the Japanese Government, the
Soviet Union entered into negotiations with Japan in April 1956, and
as a result, a Convention Concerning the High Seas Fisheries of the
Northwest Pacific Ocean -52 was concluded between the two countries.
The Convention covers the high seas of the whole northwestern part
of the Pacific, including the Bering Sea, the Sea of Japan and the Sea
of Okhotsk. It stipulates regulations on salmon, herring and king crab
fisheries, and provides various methods of control. In addition, it has
established the Northwest Pacific Fishery Commission which meets an-
49. Id. art. 13.
50. See pp. 153-54 infra.
51. For the background of the "Bulganin Line," see Ohira, Fishery Problems between
Soviet Russia and Japan, 2 JAPANESE ANNUAL OF INT'L L. 1 (1958) ; Ginsburgs & Shrews-
bury, The Soviet-Japanese Fisheries Problem in the North-West Pacific, 5 INT'L STUDIFS
259 (1964).
52. May 14, 1956, 17-18 Sbornik Deist. Dogovorov 312, 6 Sov. STAT. & DEc. 359 (effec-
tive Dec. 12, 1956) [hereinafter cited as Northwest Pacific Fisheries Convention].
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nually. Among the Commission's functions are:
(1) to revise, based on scientific data, the regulatory measures stipu-
lated in the Annex of the Convention;
(2) to decide on the annual total catch and fix the national quota
for each country;
(3) to prepare and coordinate projects for joint scientific investiga-
tions on the fishery resources, and make recommendations to the Parties;
and
(4) to make recommendations on the questions of conservation and
increase of the fishery resources.53
Each party is explicitly obliged to take necessary measures to enforce
the regulation on its own citizens and to report to the Commission on
the measures adopted.54 In addition to such national control measures,
the Convention establishes a system of mutual enforcement, allowing on-
board inspection by the other party's officials.55
2. Northeast Atlantic Seals Agreement (with Norway)
In an effort to establish international cooperation for the purpose
of attaining the optimum productivity of seal stocks in the northeastern
Atlantic, the governments of the Soviet Union and Norway concluded
an Agreement on Measures to Regulate Sealing and to Protect Seal Stocks
in the Northeast Atlantic on November 22, 1957.56
The regulations binding upon nationals of the two countries are set
forth in the Annex to the Agreement. These include designation of
hunting areas, prohibition of the hunting of certain species of seals
throughout the year or during prescribed months, and prohibitions of
the use of poisonous substances and other methods which result in con-
siderable loss of wounded animals.
The Agreement has established a Commission whose major functions
are to make proposals concerning the hunting regulations, joint or in-
dependent scientific research and its coordination, and control over the
implementation of the hunting regulations.57 However, the proposals,
53. Id. art. 4.
54. Id. art. 6.
55. Id. art. 7. See p. 29-30 infra.
56. 20 Sbornik Deist. Dogovorov 485, 6 Soy. STAT. & DEc. 371 (1970), 309 U.N.T.S.
629 [hereinafter cited as Northeast Atlantic Seals Agreement].
57. Id. arts. 3, 4.
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which must be adopted unanimously by the Commission, become bind-
ing only if they are also approved by the two Governments. 5s
3. Agreement on King Crab Fisheries (with the U.S.)
On February 5, 1965, the Soviet Union entered into an Agreement
Relating to Fishing for King Crab59 with the United States. The Agree-
ment allows the Soviet fishermen to carry out commercial fishing on
the U.S. continental shelf in the eastern Bering Sea, and also fixes the
limit on the total annual catch by the Soviets. 0 It prohibits the catch
of female and smaller-sized crabs,6' and the use of fishing gear other than
pot and tangle net.62
In addition to the duty of each party to enforce the above regulations
on its own nationals and vessels, the Agreement further obligates each
state to accept inspection by the other party's officers.6s This Agreement
was originally to last for two years, but was extended for two years in
1967, 1969 and 1971.
IV
ENFORCEMENT OF HIGH SEAS FISHERIES REGULATIONS
From this review of the Soviet treaty practice, it is clear that the
Soviet Union does not currently follow a policy of unilateralism, con-
stituting an extreme normative nationalist approach to the question of
high sea fisheries regulation. On the contrary, she is now an active par-
ticipant in a number of arrangements for both conservation and rational
exploitation of marine resources. Not all such arrangements, however,
show strong commitments by the Soviet Government to internationalism
in this field. The degree of such commitments can best be analyzed by
focusing on the system of enforcement of the agreed regulations. As
mentioned earlier, this is also the key point by which to test the sover-
eignty hypothesis.
58. Id. art. 7.
59. [1965] 1 U.S.T. 24, T.I.A.S. No. 5752, 541 U.N.T.S. 97 [hereinafter cited as King
Crab Fisheries Agreement].
60. Id. para. 2.
61. Id. Appendix, para. 2 (a).
62. Id. Appendix, para. 2 (b).
63. Id. para. 3.See p. 151 infra.
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A. Enforcement Mechanisms
The international agreements outlined may be classified into the fol-
lowing groups according to the kind of enforcement mechanism they
contemplate:
Type of Enforcement
Mechanism
Treaties
1. Potential authority to
recommend enforcement
schemes64
2. National Enforcement
3. National Enforcement
with International
Supervision
4. Mutual Inspection of
National Enforcement
5. Mutual Enforcement
6. International Inspection of
National Enforcement
West Pacific Research Agreement
Black Sea Fishery Agreement
Northeast Atlantic Seals Agreement
Northeast Atlantic Seals Agreement
King Crab Fisheries Agreement
I'WC Convention
ICNAF Convention
NEAFG Convention
Northwest Pacific Fisheries Convention
King Crab Fisheries Agreement
Interim Convention on the North Pa-
cific Fur Seals
Northwest Pacific Fisheries Convention
ICNAF Convention
NEAFC Convention
IWC Convention (proposed)
7. International Enforcement (none)
Each of the enforcement mechanisms listed must be examined as it
has been developed and applied by the fishery commissions since the
treaties were signed. This will allow the characteristics of the systems
which the Soviet Union prefers in her actual practice of high seas fishery
management to be determined.
64. This is not really a type of enforcement but is listed here for convenience.
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1. Potential Authority to Recommend Enforcement Schemes
The treaties cited in the first category confer on their commissions
potential authority to recommend enforcement schemes. The Vest
Pacific Research Agreement gives the Commission the power to "work out
...measures needed to maintain and increase the fishery resources," U
and recommend them to the parties. These recommendations will be-
come effective with the approval of each party concerned. 00
In a similar manner, the Black Sea Fishery Agreement lists as one of
the Commission's functions to "work out agreed measures relating to
the regulation of fishing for the purpose of maintaining and increasing
the fishery stocks of the Black Sea" and to "consider other questions
which may be entrusted to it by the Contracting Parties."0' 7 The Com-
mission may make recommendations about these matters to the parties,
whose unanimous approval is necessary for them to take effect.08
The mandate of the commissions in the above two agreements is clearly
broad enough to cover measures of enforcing regulations on fishery con-
servation. But unless the commissions take action, these agreements de-
pend on the national authority of the flag states for their enforcement.
The Northeast Atlantic Seals Agreement is a little more specific
about enforcement measures. The Commission is empowered, "if it is
deemed necessary, to submit proposals to the two Governments concern-
ing control over the implementation of the regulation governing hunt-
ing operations set forth in the Annex to this Agreement." 60 The approval
of each party is required in this case.70 The Agreement also obligates
each party to take measures necessary to ensure its observance. Thus en-
forcement falls exclusively under the national enforcement system unless
the Commission activates the provision and seeks a joint scheme.7 1
2. National Enforcement
The treaties noted in this category have explicit provisions obligating
each state party to take measures necessary for carrying out the agreement.
65. West Pacific Research Agreement, art. 3, para. 3.
66. Id. art 3, para. 4.
67. Black Sea Fishery Agreement, art. IX, paras. 1, 6.
68. Id. art. X.
69. Northeast Atlantic Seals Agreement, art. IV, para. c.
70. Id. art. VII, para. 1.
71. No action seems to have been taken in this connection to date.
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These provisions can be divided into two groups: those without a duty to
report to international commissions or the other parties, and those with
such a duty.
Some treaties have only simple provisions to the effect that each party
is obliged to carry out such measures as may be necessary to ensure
observance of the agreement in genera 2 or the specific regulations
incorporated in the agreement.7 3 No international control is involved in
any of these treaties in any form. Each party is completely free to adopt
any type of enforcement measure. This can be categorized as a Norma-
tive Nationalist approach.
3. National Enforcement with International Supervision
A group of treaties impose on the parties not only an obligation to
take necessary measures for enforcement, but also a requirement to sub-
mit reports on measures actually taken to the international fishery
commissions. The ICNAF Convention includes an article by which the
parties have agreed to take necessary action to make effective the pro-
visions of the Convention, and 'they are bound to transmit to the
Commission a statement of such action.74 The Commission then pub-
lishes a summary of such statements in its annual reports.
A similar system is found in Article 13 (1) of the NEAFC C6nven-
tion which requires party states:
to take in its territories and in regard to its own nationals and its own vessels
appropriate measures to ensure the application of the provisions of this Con-
vention and of the recommendations of the Commission which have become
binding on that Contracting State ind the punishment of infractions of the
said provisions and recommendations. (emphasis added.>
•The parties are again obligated to transmit to the Commission a
statement of the actions taken -by them for the above purposes.7 5
Most of the above measures would be at the initiative and discretion
of the parties, but there could be cases where the Commission makes
"recommendations" for national (and international) measures of con-
trol on the high seas for the same purposes.7 6 These recommendations,
which may be taken by a two-thirds majority, would become binding
72. Northeast Atlantic Seals Agreement, art. VIII.
73. King Crab Fisheries Agreement, para. 3.
74. ICNAF Convention, art. 12.
75. NEAFC Convention, art. XIII, para. 2.
76. Id. art. XIII, para. 3.
1972]
Cornell International Law Journal
upon the state concerned unless it objects to them within ninety days
of the date of notice.77
A very detailed enforcement provision is found in the Northwest
Pacific Fisheries Convention. Article 6 states:
(1) The Contracting Parties shall take appropriate and effective measures
for the purposes of carrying out the present Convention.
(4) The Contracting Parties agree, for the purpose of rendering effective
the provisions of this Convention, to enact and enforce necessary laws and
regulations with regard to their nationals, organizations, and fishing vessels,
with appropriate penalties against violations thereof, and to submit to the
Commission a report on any action taken by them with regard thereto.
However, the most detailed national enforcement scheme spelled out
in any international agreement is contained in the International Whal-
ing Convention. The Convention requires each government not only
to take appropriate measures to ensure the application of the pro-
visions, but specifically imposes a duty on it to punish infractions against
the provisions by persons and vessels under its jurisdiction.78 Prosecution
for such infractions must be instituted by the government having juris-
diction over the offense.79 All the laws and regulations and their
changes relating to whales and whaling must be transmitted to the
Commission.8 0 In addition, each government must appoint and main-
tain on each factory ship under its flag at least two "inspectors of
whaling" for the purpose of maintaining twenty-four hour inspection.
Each land station must likewise be placed under "adequate inspection"
by government-appointed inspectors.8 ' Each government has a fur-
ther obligation to transmit to the Commission "full details of each in-
fraction of the provisions" of the Convention by persons or vessels under
its jurisdiction as reported by its inspectors. Such report must contain
a statement of measures taken for dealing with the infraction as well as
of penalties imposed.8 2 In order to put these regulations into practice,
the Commission has adopted a standard form which is to be completed
and filed with the Commission each year before its annual meeting.
The information which the form demands includes "the manner in
which inspection was carried out," "whether any factory ships or whale
catchers operated in prohibited areas," and "the number of whales taken
77. Id. art. VIII.
78. IWC Convention, art. IX, para. 1.
79. Id. art. IX, para. 3.
80. Id. Schedule, para. 15.
81. Id. Schedule, para. 1 (a), (b.
82. Id. art. IX, para. 4.
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in violation of the Convention."83
Under the four treaties just outlined, the Soviet Union has assumed
the obligation to report her national enforcement actions to supervisory
commissions. In some cases, i.e., NEAFC Convention and International
Whaling Convention, the enforcement measures which have to be taken
are not entirely at her discretion. Submitting reports to an international
body means subjecting national actions to some sort of international
public review. Thus the commissions can theoretically bring psycho-
logical and political pressures against a negligent party. This has actual-
ly been done by IWC, NEAFC, and ICNAF. For example, the Infrac-
tions Committee of NEAFC reviews reports of the parties and for-
wards them to the Plenary Commission. The latter again discusses the
reports, and its summary will be published in the annual reports. If
it considers enforcement by a state inadequate, it expresses its con-
cern.8 4 Although these are not legal pressures and therefore have no
binding effect, they may well be important enough to be characterized
as having a kind of supervisory function. In this sense, even though
these systems of enforcement are national in form, they are not absolute
but functional in substance. Thus they represent the Functional
Nationalist approach.
4. Mutual Inspection of National Enforcement
The King Crab Fisheries Agreement with the United States provides
for a procedure under which one party may inspect the other's state of
self-enforcement. If one of the parties requests permission to ob-
serve, the other party must provide the opportunity for such observa-
tion by permitting duly authorized officers to board its vessels engaged
in king crab fishing in the eastern Bering Sea. The boarding officers will
make a report on the result of their observations, and the report will
be forwarded to the government of the vessel's flag state for appropriate
action.8 5
This is another example of the Functional Nationalist approach.
Enforcement power is in the hands of a national government, but it is
obliged to perform certain internationally agreed functions under the
other party's inspection.
83. A. KoERs, supra note 5, at 27.
84. Id. at 25-31.
85. King Crab Fisheries Agreement, para. 3.
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5. Mutual Enforcement
This is a system of enforcement of high seas fisheries regulations
wherein a party to an agreement is entitled to make on-the-spot checks
to determine if regulations are being observed by another party's fisher-
men, and to seize and arrest vessels and persons suspected of violations.80
The Soviet Union is currently a party to two treaties which incorporate
such mechanisms of enforcement. The most elaborate procedure for such
a system is found in the Interim Convention on the Conservation of
North Pacific Fur Seals. In order to implement the ban on pelagic
sealing, a duly authorized official of any of the parties may first board
and search any vessel flying one of the parties' flag on the high seas when
he has reasonable cause to believe that she is violating the Convention.
If the official, after searching the vessel, continues to have reasonable
cause to believe that the vessel or anybody on board is committing an
offense, he may seize or arrest them. The arresting party must promptly
notify the party having jurisdiction over the suspected vessel or person,
and hand them over at an agreed place. If the detained party's country
cannot receive the offender immediately, the arresting party may keep
the vessel or person under surveillance within its own territory. How-
ever, this may only be done upon request by the offender's country and
under conditions agreed upon by both parties.8 7
The Convention further spells out the procedure for trial of vessels
or persons thus arrested. The trial of such cases is placed exclusively
within the jurisdiction of the party to which the vessel or person be-
longs. The arresting party must promptly furnish the witnesses or their
testimony and other proofs necessary to establish the offense to the
authorities of the trying party.8 8 If any punitive measures are taken
86. A classic example of a mutual enforcement system was the North Sea Police
Convention of 1882, Maxv 6, 1882, 73 BRIT. FOR. STATE PAPERS 39, IX Martens Nouveau
Recueil, ser. 1, at 556, 1 UN LEG. SER., LAWS AND REGULATIONS ON THE REGIME OF THF
HIGH SEAs 179 (English trans.). See A. KOERs, supra note 5, at 9-10; Aglen, Problems of
Enforcement of Fisheries Regulations, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: THE FUTURE OF TIlE
SEA'S RYsouRcEs 19-20 (L. Alexander ed. 1967).
The existing treaties providing for seizure or arrest to which the Soviet Union is not
a party are: Convention with Canada concerning the Sockeye Salmon Fisheries, May 26,
1930, art IX, 50 Stat. 1355 (1937), T.S. No. 918; International Convention for the High
Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, done May 9, 1952, art. X, para. 1, [1953]
1 U.S.T. 380, T.IA.S. No. 2786, 205 U.N.T.S. 65; Convention with Canada on Preser-
vation of the Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea, Mar. 2,
1953, art. II, para. 1, [1954] 1 U.S.T. 5, T.I.A.S. No. 2900, 222 U.N.T.S. 77.
87. Interim Convention on Seals, art. VI.
88. Id. art. VI, paras, 3, 4.
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against the offenders, their full details must be communicated to all
the other parties not more than three months after being adjudged.8 9
A very similar mutual enforcement procedure is found in the North-
west Pacific Fisheries Convention90 which was concluded before the Fur
Seals Convention. The provisions of the earlier convention differs in only
two minor points: (1) the delivery of a suspected vessel or person must
be made at the place of the detention or seizure unless another place is
agreed upon; and (2) the report of national measures for punishment
must be filed with the Commission rather than with the other party.91
The Fisheries Convention's scheme, however, has been supplemented
by subsequent practice. Under informal agreements between the two gov-
ernments reached in 1965 and 1966, Japan consented to an arrangement
whereby Soviet inspectors are to be stationed on board Japanese salmon
fishing vessels and also at certain fishing bases in Hokkaido, Japan's
northern-most island.92
The procedure found in the two treaties just outlined is of great
significance from the viewpoint of sovereignty restriction. By it, the
Soviet Union has agreed to let other states' enforcement jurisdiction ex-
tend to her own vessels and fishermen. Although she retains the ultimate
power to punish suspects, the results of such punishment are also made
subject to the other parties' critical review.
It is quite clear in this case that underlying the enforcement mechan-
ism is a belief in the functional necessity of enforcing international
regulations in a more objective manner than by merely allowing enforce-
ment by national authorities of the offender's state. Since, however, it
still uses the instrument of nation-states as its means of enforcement, it
remains a Functional Nationalist approach.
6. International Inspection of National Enforcement
Reference has already been made to the provisions for national en-
forcement with a duty to report to an international commission under
the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Convention. In practice, the NEAFC
has gone further and successfully developed a "Scheme of Joint Enforce-
ment" which is in more exact terms a scheme not of joint enforcement,
but rather one of joint inspection of national enforcement. 93 The Conven-
89. Id. art. VI, para. 6.
90. Northwest Pacific Fisheries Convention, art. VII.
91. Id. art. VI, para. 4.
92. 27 COMMERCIAL FisHmuzs REvm, June 1965, at 43; 28 id. June 1966, at 48.
93. For our definition of enforcement see p. 133, supra.
1972]
Cornell International Law Journal
tion commission adopted it in May, 1967 acting under the mandate of
Article 13 (3) which grants it the authority to make recommendations
for national and international measures of control on the high seas. 4
According to the Scheme, inspectors from each party are given authority
to board fishing vessels of any party in the Convention zones in order
to ascertain if the regulations are being observed. They can, for this
purpose, inspect the nets, other fishing gear, and any relevant documents.
They can also take photos of any net which is found to be contrary to
the regulations together with an identification mark approved by the
Commission. The inspectors, however, have no power to enforce regula-
tions in case a violation is found. This may not seem to be significantly
different from the procedure of mutual inspection of national enforce-
ment which was discussed earlier. However, the significant and distinc-
tive aspect of this scheme is the strong international control of the in-
spectors and inspection procedures. This enables it to be designated a
system of international inspection of national enforcement. It provides
that the parties must give the names of inspectors and of vessels used
for inspection to the Commission although the inspectors are nominated
by each party from among its fishing inspection organs. Every inspector
must carry a certificate authorized by the Commission and containing a
statement that the inspector is authorized to act in accordance with the
provisions approved by the Commission. The vessels for inspection must
carry a special flag approved by the Commission, and the inspectors
must draw up a report on the inspection in the form approved by the
Commission. The Scheme further requires parties to inform the Com-
mission annually by March of their provisional inspection plans for the
coming year. This enables the Commission to coordinate national plans
and make suggestions for this purpose as it deems necessary.
The Soviet Union has attached a reservation to the Scheme to the
effect that she does not consider herself bound by those provisions allow-
ing the inspection of catches and nets kept in vessels' holds, which the
Soviet Union regards as irrelevant to the Convention's purpose. 0
The NEAFC's Scheme of Joint Enforcement is followed almost literally
by ICNAF which has recently adopted a Scheme of Joint International
Enforcement.9 6 ICNAF was originally given no power to discuss or recom-
mend measures of enforcement. However, by the "Protocol Relating to
94. REPORT OF THE SIXTH MEETING, NEAFO, ANNEX (May 1968). The Scheme went
into force on January 1, 1970.
95. A. A. VOLKOV, MARITIME LAW 98 (1969).
96. ICNAF, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH MEETING, Appendices I, II, and III
(1970); 20 ICNAF ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS 21-22 (1969-1970).
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Measures of Control" 97 which was signed in 1965 and entered into force
in December 1969, the Commission is authorized to make on its own
initiative proposals for national and international measures of control
on high seas fishery regulations.
In 1966-67, the Commission had lengthy discussions on control meas-
ures using the proposed scheme of joint enforcement of NEAFC as their
basis of discussion.98 The Commission then recommended that an ad hoc
Committee on Trawl Regulation consider the matter. They adopted a
slightly amended form of NEAFC's Scheme and submitted it to the 1968
Annual Meeting. After it was empowered by the Protocol Relating to
Measures of Control to recommend an enforcement scheme in late 1969,
the Commission in 1970 adopted the Scheme of Joint International En-
forcement 99 which entered into force on July 1, 1971. The Soviet Union
also filed a reservation in this instance excepting the inspection below
deck as well as the control of fish size from the Scheme's coverage. 100
It should also be noted that ICNAF has been successful in completing
bilateral exchanges of fisheries inspection officers among the member
states, including those between the United States and the USSR during
the year 1968-69.101 Such experience would undoubtedly be conducive
to successful implementation of the Joint Enforcement Scheme.
A stronger international inspection scheme has recently been worked
out by parties to the International Whaling Convention, but it has
not been ratified by some parties.
The history of an international observer scheme within the IWC goes
back to 1959 when an amendment to Article 5 (1) (Methods of Inspec-
tion) of the 1946 Convention enabled the Commission to deal with the
observer scheme proposed by Norway. It was agreed in principle at the
Annual Meeting of 1959 that the factory ships engaged in the Antarctic
whaling should carry some other parties' observers than those of the flag
state. These observers were to serve independent of any party or authority
other than the Commission. However, this plan made no further progress
after Norway and the Netherlands withdrew from the Commission in
mid-I 959. The question was placed on the agenda again at the Fourteenth
Annual Meeting (1962), and as a result of meetings between the five
97. Opened for signature Nov. 29, 1965, T.I.A.S. No. 6840, 5 INT'L LEG. MAT. 718(1966).
98. 17 ICNAF ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS 21 (1966-1967).
99. Id.
100. ICNAF, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWVENIETH ANNUAL MEETING, Proceeding No. 15,
at 2 (1970).
101. 19 ICNAF ANNUAL PROCEEDINcS 20 (1968-1969).
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Antarctic pelagic whaling nations in 1963, details of an International
Observer Scheme were agreed upon. According to the proposed Scheme,
the five states were to nominate observers in numbers equivalent to the
number of each state's whaling expeditions. They were to be appointed
to serve in the expedition of the other four states. All the observers were
to be appointed by the Commission and to be given power to verify the
observance of the Convention and the Schedule in regard to the taking
of whales and their utilization by the expedition.10 2
The 1963 Scheme was not implemented for the 1963-64 season due
to a lack of time for discussion of its implementation procedure.103 In
1964, however, delegates of the Scheme's signatory countries agreed on
draft rules for its implementation. Later the governments of Japan, Nor-
way, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom formally accepted the
rules, but the Soviet Union refused to do so without prior revision of the
arrangements governing national quotas on a basis satisfactory to her.104
Moreover, in the Seventeenth Meeting (1965), she added another con-
dition to the effect that the International Observer Scheme should be
extended to cover all land stations for Antarctic whaling as well. 105
The 1963 Scheme thus expired at the end of the 1965-66 season with-
out being brought into operation. The Commission then agreed at the
Eighteenth Meeting to set up a working group to draw up a new scheme
to cover both pelagic and land station whaling.10 6 The working group
met in June 1967 and submitted a report on the International Observer
Scheme 107 to the Commission. An important innovation in the working
group's recommendation was the establishment of several regional
schemes rather than a single all-embracing one. Each regional scheme was
to be negotiated among the countries participating in whaling in the
region concerned. It was also recommended that such regional schemes
should take the 1963 Scheme as their basis.' 08 The Commission adopted
the working group's recommendation and invited the countries con-
cerned to establish regional schemes along the proposed line.
During subsequent years, despite the Commission's urgings to put
the regional schemes into operation as soon as possible, no substantive
steps were taken by whaling states until the Twenty-third Meeting
102. IWC, RFTENTu REPORT oF THE Co MissioN 20-21 (1963-1964).
103. Id. at 7.
104. IWC, SrxTEENTH REPORT OF THE COMMISSION (1964-1965). The Soviet Union
insisted on this condition repeatedly in subsequent years.
105. IWC, SEVENTEENTH REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 21-22 (1965-1966).
106. IWC, EIGHTEENTH REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 9 (1966-1967).
107. IWC, NINETEENTH REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 20-22 (1967-1968).
108. Id. at 20-21.
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(1971) when a special meeting on the International Observer Scheme was
held with representatives from Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, South
Africa, the USSR, and the U.S. These countries agreed on the contents
of a draft International Observer Scheme. According to the draft, 09 an
observer is appointed by the Commission to each expedition for pelagic
whaling, and to each land station or group of land stations. The ob-
servers are chosen from those who are nominated by each member gov-
ernment and are responsible to the Commission though their salaries
and other emoluments are paid by the respective nominating govern-
ment. They are prohibited to seek or receive instructions from any
authority other than the Commission.
They are specifically assigned to verify the observance of the pro-
visions of the Convention and the Schedule in regard to the taking and
rational utilization of whales. For this purpose, they are to be given
every facility needed and access to all the relevant records and data. The
observers must notify the master or manager of the expedition or land
station and the senior national observer of any infraction they find. The
latter then informs the Commission. The draft of the Scheme provides
that the observers are to be given the status of senior officers or officals
by the receiving state.
In the latest development, three draft agreements concerning the
International Observer Scheme have recently been prepared covering the
North Pacific factory ships, Antarctic factory ships, and North Pacific
land stations respectively. In September 1971, the negotiators of the
Soviet Union, Japan, and Norway initialed the agreement concerning the
Antarctic factory ships, and those of the first two countries also agreed
on the scheme covering the North Pacific factory ships.11 0 However, ac-
cording to Japanese Government sources, the Soviet fleet departed
for the Antarctic in early October before the ratification of the first
agreement, and thus without international observers on board.1 1" ' This
means the International Observer Scheme has not effectively material-
ized for the 1971-72 season as far as the Antarctic factory ship whaling
is concerned. The agreement concerning the North Pacific factory ships
is still waiting for ratification which is required if the Scheme is to be
put into effect in the spring of 1972.
109. IWC, Draft International Observer Scheme, June 22, 1971 (mimeo.).
The purpose of an observer scheme is "to maintain surveillance whenever whales
are being delivered to the factory ship or land station or are being processed." Id.
110. N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1971, at 12, cols. 4, 5.
111. Id.
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Reviewing the attitudes of the Soviet delegates toward the Interna-
tional Whaling Commission and its related functions, it is difficult to
draw a firm conclusion regarding their serious willingness to accept an
international observer scheme. Although they have often insisted on
the need for such a scheme," 2 they have frequently shown an unwilling-
ness to accept the final adoption of a scheme by imposing new conditions.
One such condition has been the necessity of renegotiating a national
quota system; another was the inclusion of land stations among the
places to be inspected; a third was related to purely technical questions
of treaty interpretation and meeting procedure. However, if the Soviet
Union ratifies the recent agreement on the North Pacific Scheme, she
would be among the first states to accept a full-fledged international in-
spection system.
In the practice of these three most recent Conventions, an inter-
national body, i.e., each of the Commissions, is engaged directly or in-
directly in conducting inspection of rule-compliance by the nationals or
ships of party states. In the case of NEAFC and IGNAF, this is to be
done by national inspectors who are appointed by each party state and
responsible only to that state, but who perform their duties under sub-
stantial control of the Commission.
In the case of IWC, inspectors who are almost entirely free from
national control, act functionally like international civil servants.
In all cases, a basic understanding among the party states seems to be
that, despite their reluctance to give up their individual enforcement
powers, the contemporary high seas fishery situation requires them lo
submit to a certain degree of international inspection of such enforce-
ment. This fits these latest conventions squarely into the category of
the Functional Internationalist models.
CONCLUSION
The survey of the contemporary Soviet treaty practice on high seas
fisheries with its emphasis on the enforcement mechanisms leads to
some interesting conclusions regarding the initial sovereignty hypothesis.
To summarize the findings of the preceding sections, there are four
treaties classified as Normative Nationalist, six as Functional Nationalist,
112. See, e.g., IWC, SEVENTEENTH REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 22 (1965-1966); IWC,
NINETEENTH REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 22 (1967-1968) ; Draft International Observer
Scheme, June 22, 1971 (mimeo).
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three as Functional Internationalist and none as Normative International-
ist; some of them, however, tend to be overlapping. The treaties can be
placed on a nationalism-internationalism scale as follows:
Normative Functional Functional Normative
Nationalist Internationalist
West Pacific IWC Conv. ICNAF Conv.
Research ICNAF Conv. NEAFC Cony.
Agreement NEAFC Conv. IWC Cony.
Northwest Pacific (proposed)
Black Sea Fishery Fisheries Conv.
Agreement King Crab Fish-
King Crab eries Agreement
Fisheries North Pacific Fur
Agreement Seals Conv.
Northeast Atlantic
Seals Agreement
From this chart, it is possible to draw the following observations:
(1) All the high seas fishery treaties which are most significant in
terms of the international fishery grounds that they cover, and of the
participation of major fishing countries, belong to Functionalist models,
i.e., either Functional Nationalist or Functional Internationalist.
(2) All the treaties with only Communist participation are Normative
Nationalist while all Functionalist treaties have non-Communist par-
ticipation. This finding fortifies the characterization of Functionalist
models as being freer from ideological considerations.
(3) There is no Normative Internationalist treaty. However, this is
not unique to Soviet practice; such a treaty does not yet exist.
In the final analysis, the "sovereignty hypothesis" set forth at the be-
ginning of this article cannot find proof in the contemporary Soviet prac-
tice in the field of high seas fisheries regulation. On the contrary, the
Soviet Union has demonstrated a rather strong willingness to make ex-
ceptions to her jurisdictional sovereignty in this particular field of inter-
national law. This is true, ironically, in the case of East-West arrange-
ments. If this general trend continues in the future, and one may
19721
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fairly predict it will, development of closer East-West cooperation in the
form of stronger Functionalist models in this area may well be expected.
Whether or not it will take the form of Functional Internationalist
rather than Nationalist models may depend substantially on the future
successful implementation of the inspection schemes of ICNAF, NEAFC,
and IWC conventions.
